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Roundtable: The Politics of Culture and Identity in 
Contemporary Nepal 
Organizers: William F. Fisher and Susan Hangen 
Panelists: Karl-Heinz Kramer, Laren Leve, David 
Romberg, Mukta S. Tamang, Judith 
Pettigrew,and Mary Cameron 
William F. Fisher and Susan Hangen 
Introduction 
In the years since the 1990 "restoration" of democracy, 
ethnic activism has become a prominent and, for some, a 
worrisome part of Nepal's political arena. The "janajati" 
movement is composed of a mosaic of social organizations 
and political parties dominated by groups of peoples who 
have historically spoken Tibeto-Burman languages. This 
movement has reshaped political discourse in Nepal by per-
sistently challenging the previously-accepted view of na-
tional culture, religion, and language, and by presenting a 
potentially revolutionary vision of Nepal as a multi-cultural, 
multi-linguistic, and multi-religious state. This conflict pits 
anger and resentment about the two-hundred-year-history 
of economic, political, and cultural dominance of Nepal 
by high-caste hill Hindus against fears that Nepal is on the 
verge of violent disintegration that would make it another 
Sri Lanka or Yugoslavia. 
This roundtable brought together scholars who have 
conducted extensive research on different dimensions of 
the janajati movement to share their perspectives, explore 
the divergent and sometimes contradictory modes of ac-
tivism in the janajati movement, and to discuss the changes 
that are occurring as new organizations emerge, actors re-
position themselves, and new issues arise. 1 The 
roundtable's primary goal was to explore in some depth 
the complex and changing nature of relationships among 
various actors, social organizations, political parties, and 
1Roundtable was part of the Annual Meeting of the Assqciation 
of Asian Studies, held in Boston, MA on March 12, 1999. 
Roundtable participants included William Fisher, David 
Gellner, Susan Hangen, Karl-Heinz Kramer, Lauren Leve, 
Kathryn March, and Mukta Singh Tamang. Addition extended 
comments were provided by David Holmberg, Judith Pettigrew, 
and Mary Cameron. 
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local populations involved in and affected by the janajati 
movement in Nepal. 
We asked the roundtable participants to consider sev-
eral themes that derived from our own discussion: 
1. To what extent and to what end does it make sense 
to talk about a "janajati movement"? Reflecting a wide 
variety of intentions, goals, definitions, and strategies, do 
the wide-ranging practices of activists in social organiza-
tions and constitute a movement or are they but a discor-
dant set of disparate actions? To what extent are groups 
like the MNO or the Janajati Mahasangh engaged in the 
same project? 
2. How significant is the distinction between social 
and political spheres in Janajati discourse? Some Janajati 
activists take pains to distinguish between activities and 
groups that are part of a Janajati social movement, on one 
hand, and those which are part of a Janajati political move-
ment, on the other. While this distinction appears on the 
surface to echo distinctions made by social movement theo-
rists, we might question how cleanly this demarcation can 
be drawn . What is the relationship between new asser-
tions of social and political identity and attempts to create 
effective political strategies? 
3. How do post-1990 ethnic social and political orga-
nizations differ in form, membership, and in the issues they 
address from those which existed during the Panchayat era? 
How have previously existing ethnic organizations re-po-
sitioned themselves and re-cast their historical narratives 
in the post-Panchayat era? 
4. How does the work of foreign and Nepali scholars 
articulate with contemporary ethnic politics in Nepal? How 
have the ways in which scholars have classified difference 
in Nepa l influenced or informed the strategies contempo-
rary political activists employ to assert or re-classify dif-
ference? 
5. How does the Janajati movement articulate with in 
a larger frame encompassing the politics of difference in 
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contemporary Nepal, including the politics of class, gen-
der, and geography? 
William F. Fisher, Chair 
Opening Remarks 
I welcome everyone to the AAS roundtable on the Poli-
tics of Culture and Iden tity in Contemporary Nepal. We 
are fortunate to have here today a wide range of scholars 
who have conducted research on different aspects of the 
Janajati movement. I will start with some background re-
marks to help frame and initiate our exchange. 
Within Nepal there are widespread di sagreements about 
th~ seriousness of Nepal 's "ethnic problem", the threat it 
poses to national integration, and its causes. Some say that 
the Janajati problem is one of the most serious problems 
faced by Nepal at the moment but others argue that the 
current furor is merely the work of a few disgruntled eth-
nic elites in Kathmandu, who are out for personal ga in , 
and some even point to the complicity of foreign scholars 
in emphasizing ethnic differences and promoting a critical 
view of the two hundred year hi story of nation building in 
Nepal. 
Some of my high cas te informants hav e said 
di sm iss ively that the whole Janaj ati movement could be 
ended with just 20 or so hi gh government appointments . 
When I paraphrased these claims to Janajati activists they 
laughed and noted that they too had heard these remarks. 
But they interpreted comments like thi s as signs of grow-
ing respec t for the movement since the estimated number 
of government appointments needed to end the movement 
had apparently doubled within one year. 
Scholars, too, have quest ioned the size of the janajati 
movement and challenged or di sm iss the authenticity or 
sign ificance of views expressed by a collection of ethnic 
"elites" or "intellectuals." One oftod ay's participants, in a 
recent volume, has cautioned us not to unquestioningly 
"give full credence to the most vocal and most active pro-
ponents of ethnic identity" and has rem inded us of the "duty 
to pay attention to the values and world views of ordinary 
people."' I agree with this view but offer an additional 
caut ion. It is apparent that what appears on the surface to 
be a resurgence of traditional ethnic identities in Nepal is, 
at least in part, a se lective intellectual construction oriented 
as much to the future as to the past, and as much toward 
the modern as it is to the traditional. Janajati activists are 
2Dav id Gellner. 1997. "Ethnicity and Nationalism in the 
World 's only Hindu State," in Natioualis111 and Ethuicity in a 
Hindu Kiugdo111. Eds. David N. Gellner. Joanna Pfaff-
Czarnecka. and John Welpton. Harwood. pp. 19, 23. 
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negotiating identities as they move toward modernity their 
own terms. 
But while everyday li ves are important anthropologi-
cal material, we would be ill -advised to treat some people 
as more "ordinary" than others and thus more worthy of 
study, and we risk oversimplification if we focus on some 
momentary lack of fit between what activists say and the 
feelings of those on whose behalf they claim to speak, and 
then take this lack of fit to be evidence of how unauthentic 
the voices of ethnic activists are. Tracking a movement is 
not merely a matter of assessing the size of the constitu-
ency at a particular moment, but also entails close atten-
tion to both the persistent assertion of new views, hi sto-
ries, categories, and perspectives as well as the resonance 
of some of these assertions with a wider population. 
The innovative narratives of the activists may notal-
ways reflect change that has already happened in the vil-
lages, but we should bear in mind that the politics of cul -
ture entails simultaneous battle at numerous levels in vari-
ous political and geographic spaces. It would be ironic if 
as anthropologists we emphasize the need to listen to and 
make space for previously unheard voices but at the same 
time dismiss some voices by insisting that we are the best 
determiners of whose voices are ordinary or authentic 
enough to be heard. 
Depending on the speaker, current ethnic unrest is at-
tributed to a variety of causes . Ethnic ac tivists attribute it 
to two hundred years of Hindu oppression and growing 
awareness of this history among affected social groups. But 
less charitable views portray it as a misunderstanding and 
misuse of new democratic processes and political freedom 
to promote what are essentiall y commtmal claims. In the 
judgement of this latter group, there is no basis for the fear 
of ethnic conflict at the grass roots level or among rural 
areas in Nepal. 
At the heart of the debate about identity, difference and 
national culture are two co~11peting views of the nation of 
Nepa l. One portrays a democratic Hindu kingdom com-
posed of a harmonious flower ga rden of four vamas and 
36 jats which share a heroic past, speak a common lan-
guage, follow a common religion , and are led, at least sym-
bolically, by a divine and benevolent king. A second view 
opposes a Nepali past of internal colonization, Hindu op-
pression, and the forced assimilation of non-Hindu minori-
ties into a hierarchical system, to an emergent vision of 
Nepal as a "nation in the making" . In this view, thi s "na-
tion in the making" if it is to achieve nationhood at all, can 
onl y do so as a culturally plural and secular society. 
For many residents in Nepal, the term "janajati," at least 
as it is cutTently used, seemed to appea r almost overnight 
and within a few years had become widely used and ac-
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knowledged. The term became popular in the mid 1980s 
among a small group of ethnic activists who deliberately 
translated into English as "nationalities" and employed it 
to draw attention to their argument that Nepali society con-
sists of a number of different but equal nationalities which 
collectively constitute the nation. It become common on 
the national scene by the mid 1990s. The ambiguity of the 
English definition for "nationalities" is also consistent with 
the different claims and strategies which are present in the 
janajati movement: "nationalities" may refer to "groups of 
people, each of which has a common and distinguishing 
linguistic and cultural background and form one constitu-
' ent element of a larger group (as a nation)" or it may also 
suggest that each of these aggregations of people is "po-
tentially capable of forming a nation state."3 
The Janajati activists have set out not only to oppose 
what they describe as a state-created and maintained sys-
tem of social hierarchy but also to demarcate and shape a 
new social system-one that is non-hierarchical and non-
discriminatory. They set out to do this through a number 
of interrelated strategies: I) They challenge the symbols 
of the nation, subversively appropriate and recodify signs, 
and look within their own group's history and traditions 
for symbols of unity around which their community may 
be re-imagined and mobilized. It is in this process that 
social groups may become political entities-nationali-
ties-which may begin to bargain with the state for in-
creased social, political, and economic rights of their citi-
zens. 2) They legitimize their actions by citing a history of 
subordination, land theft, and slavery at the hands of the 
ruling elite. 3) They emphasize a number of stark dichoto-
mies: janajati and jati, indigenous and non-indigenous, 
Hindu and Non-Hindu, flat nose and pointy nose, all of 
which call attention to ongoing processes of discrimina-
tion . 4) They establish new sets of categories within which 
to locate peoples: foremost in this process is a re-writing 
of their community histories and a demand for a recon-
ceived national historical narrative. They also embrace 
previously despised characterizations and reinterpret them 
with positive attributes. 
Stokely Carmichael noted the importance of this kind 
of process: 
"the basic need is to reclaim history and identity from what 
must be called cultural tetTorism ... we shall have to struggle 
for the right to create our own terms through which to de-
fine ourselves and our relationship to the society and to 
have these terms recognize".4 • 
The report of Nepal's National Committee for the UN 
.1See, for instance, the unabridged Oxford English Dictionary. 
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Year of Indigenous People also makes this concern very 
clear: 
"We, the indigenous people of Nepal, wish to protect 
our ethn ic identities ... and we are working to redesctibe his-
tory. We want to write our hi stories ourselves. 
The government that has been ruling has been cover-
ing up the true facts about indigenous people, and has been 
describing, writing, and publishing history form imperial-
ist and internal colonialist perspectives. We want to an-
nounce that, on the religious front, we are free from the 
country and the state's constitution, and want to act 
accordingly ... we have been divided by the cultural and 
political repression of Hindu nationalism. We want to be 
equals again. We want to use our ancestral land, sources 
and media freely again ... Our culture is caught between the 
unjust Hindu culture and the excessively liberal Western 
culture .. .Instead of increasing the standard of living of 
janajati peoples, development projects conducted by the 
governmental and nongovernmental organizations actually 
decrease it and act to eliminate cultural identity ... we want 
a society unified in diversity."5 
The counter natTatives of nationalism put forth by the 
janajati are often dismissed as a strange brew of facts, fic-
tions, and myths. Indeed, some of the details of these sto-
ries may not stand up to intense academic scrutiny and may 
be justifiably labeled confused. But these natTatives are 
more about emotion than reason and the model of ethni-
cally plural nationalism they promote may indeed prove 
more viable and endurable than state-imposed integration 
based on suppression, exclusions, and intolerance. 
It is ironic that a state which classified and divided its 
population as a means to assimilate and rule the diverse 
segments through a state-sanctioned hierarchy must now 
find a way to address the insistence of these diverse seg-
ments that national unity can emerge through acceptance 
of them as separate and different elements of the popula-
tion. 
David Gellner 
Bmne/ University, London 
Before responding to the questions which the organiz-
ers have asked us to address, I would like to make three 
preliminary points. 
First of all, the organizers refer to some people's "fears 
•carmichael, S. and C.V. Hamilton. 1967. Black Power: The 
Politics of Liberation in America. New York: Vintage. 
5National Committee for the International Year of the World' 
Indigenous Peoples. 1993. "Indigenous People of Nepal." 
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of violent di s integration" in the face of identity politics in 
Nepal. But that process has already begun: large tracts of 
the western hills are not fully or at all controlled by the 
government, but the main actor here is the CPN (Maoist). 
The relationship between the Maoists and the Janajati ac-
tivists is by no means straightforward, but there are some 
links. And, of course, ethnic identity can play a role even 
when it is not consciously a principle of recruitment or or-
ganization. My point is that we should be discussing the 
Maoist problem at the same time. 
Second, a methodological point. As scholars we are 
always a step behind. Things happen on the ground and 
we are not always there. Even if we are 'there,' participant 
observation is not sufficient to grasp a complex phenom-
enon like 'the Janajati movement.' A variety of methods, 
and the cooperation of many different scholars, as in the 
present panel, are necessary. 
My third point is on the ethics of involvement. Some 
people say, 'Don't get involved, don ' t offer advice. You'll 
only look stupid; and, in any case, it is patronizing to offer 
advice.' Others would say, 'There is --at some point-- a 
duty to get involved and not to maintain the Olympian de-
tachment of the armchair observer.' For myself, I believe 
that scholars working in Nepal do have a duty to concern 
themselves with ethnic politics, and to do so in all humil-
ity. They also have a duty not to become the mouthpiece 
of nationalist movements, but to represent, or at least to be 
aware of, the full plurality of ordinary people's voices . 
Turning now to Bill and Susan's questions: they have 
asked us, 'Who are the activists?' In the case of the Newars 
my estimate is that there are 1-200 people, more if you 
include all the students who do no more than organize and 
publish campus magazines in Newari. They are, however, 
just the tip of an iceberg. The concerns they articulate and 
the rhetoric they use go much wider and deeper. They can, 
on occasion, mobilize quite large numbers of people, e.g. 
for the Bhintuna celebration at the beginning of the so-called 
Newar New Year. There is an important split between the 
ethnic and the Buddhist activists (the latter being more 
numerous) . There is some overlap of the two groups: a 
few people are equally active in both spheres. But for the 
most part, activists EITHER give priority to Buddhism --
in which case they want to reach the largest audience pos-
sible, and therefore use Nepali as well as Newari; and they 
want to reform, i.e. to change, traditional Newar culture--
OR they are cultural nationalists whose prime aims are to 
preserve both Newari and traditional Newar cultyre. 
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On the question of the social versus the political in ac-
tivist discourse: it is essential for ethnic activists to try and 
keep party politics out of their organizations . Why? Since 
1990 everything has become political. Trade unions have 
all split along pmty lines . Any organization that wants to 
maintain its unity and build a mass organization (the dream 
of every act ivist) must stop the politically active being 
prominent in the organization. If well-known political fig-
ures are office holders in an ethnic organization, then the 
organization is assumed to be aligned to their party (this 
happened, for example, to the Nepal Bhasa Manka Khalah, 
headed by Padma Ratna Tuladhar). This immediately alien-
ates potential members who are supporters of the other 
parties. In order to prevent this happening the Jyapu 
Mahaguthi has a rule baiTing the politically active from 
holding office within the organization, though they are 
welcome as ordinary members. This is intended to pre-
vent the organization being hijacked by a particular politi-
cal party, and to try and ensure that the organization con-
tinues to represent all Jyapus (effectively: all Jyapus of 
Kathmandu, and some outlying villages; Lalitpur has its 
own Jyapu organization). By maintaining a distance from 
political parties, ethnic organizations can hope to encour-
age a kind of bidding process between the parties to win 
their support, and indeed there is some evidence that this 
has been happening. 
I don't want to go on too long, so let me conclude. I 
think that the way forward for the Nepalese state is to en-
dorse some form of what has been called 'strategic essen-
tialism' . It should give some kind of recognition to some 
ethnic groups, i.e. continue the first multiculturalist steps 
that have already been taken. Whether these policies should 
include quotas or reservations for public sector jobs, edu-
cational opportunities, and seats in assemblies, as in India, 
is one of the most difficult current questions of Nepali poli-
tics. At the same time the state should attempt to encour-
age multiple and cross- cutting identities, including a com-
mon Nepaliness . 
Susan Hangen 
Department of Anthropology, University of Wisconsin-
Madison 
The "Janajati" Movement: A View fmm East Nepal 
We are Mongol, we are Mongol, 
No matter what others call us, 
We are Mongol. 
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While researching the Mongol National Organization 
(MNO) in eastern Nepal , I heard activists sing the refrain 
of thi s song at numerous politica l gatherings. The term 
"Mongol" hails from early 19th century ethnology and high-
lights the idea of racial unity among the numerous groups 
of peoples who have historically spoken Tibeto-Burman 
languages . As this song suggests, the MNO asserts this 
ethnonym in a field in which other people call "Mongols" 
other names. By insisting on the term Mongol , the MNO 
rejects both the label "matwali," issued by the 19th cen-
tury Nepali state, and the label "janajati" which has be-
come prevalent in the post 1990 wave of ethnic activism in 
Nepal. The MNO's rejection of the term "janajati" is at 
once an acknowledgment that the party operates in a wider 
field of activism, the "janajati" movement, and a way of 
locating itself within that movement. 
As one of several ethnic political parties that has 
emerged since 1990, the MNO positions itself in the move-
ment as a "political" rather than a "social" organization . 
The MNO sees political power as "the main key that can 
open all locks" for Mongols and seeks to gain control of 
the Nepali state - through elections, if possible, or by 
armed revolution if not. Their plans to transform the state 
so that it benefits Mongols include: restructuring Nepal as 
a federation of states where Tibeto-Burman languages are 
used and abolishing the monarchy, which it sees as a but-
tress of Hindu dominance. 
Though the MNO's founder-president, Gopal Gurung, 
is sometimes assumed to comprise the extent of the MNO, 
the party has an active "grassroots" base of support with 
active party commjttees in 8 districts. The MNO's strong-
hold is in the rural areas of Ilam district, where it has had 
limited electoral success at the village level. Given the 
party's relatively sh011 history, relatively undeveloped party 
structure, and lack of financial resources and legal status, 
the MNO has been surprisingly successful in elections. In 
the first local elections in 1991, the party won 57 seats at 
the village level and managed to gain control of several 
Village Development Committees. In 1994 national elec-
tions, the party received the third most votes after the large, 
long-established and well-funded Congress and Commu-
nist parties, and received more votes that the third most 
popular party in the nation overall , the Rastriya Prajatantra 
Party. As Articles 112(3) and 113(3) of Nepal's 1990 Con-
stitution forbid the Election Commission from registering 
political parties that are explicitly community or region 
based, the MNO is an "illegal" party. The MNO is pres-
ently the only political party that has been denied registra-
tion on this basis and still continues to put up candidates 
for election, albeit as independents. Other identity based 
political parties either boycott elections, or have widened 
the definition of the community who they claim to repre-
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sent so as to secure registration from the Election Com-
mission . By continuing to operate as a political party de-
spite this ruling, the MNO places itself in constant conflict 
with the state, thus creating and susta ining an example of 
high-caste llindu dominance of the political. 
By contrast, the Nepal Janajati Mahasangh, and the 
single ethnic-group focused organizations that constitute 
it, insist that they are non-political, social organizations. 
These organizations seek to promote the "languages, reli-
gions and cultures" of janajatis and to raise public aware-
ness about issues affecting janajatis through publiC'ations 
and conferences. Their work can be seen as political in that 
they operate as "pressure groups," working to influence 
members of the government to form policies that will up-
lift janajatis and pursuing incremental changes within the 
present system. For example, during the drafting of the 1990 
Constitution, the Janajati Mahasangh made recommenda-
tions to the Constitution Commission; and later the organi-
zation spearheaded opposition to teaching Sanskrit as a 
compulsory language in schools. As the widespread cur-
rency of the term "janajati" reflects, this strategy of ac-
commodation is the prevalent and legal way to make claims 
on the basis of ethnicity in post 1990 Nepal. Furthermore, 
some activists in these organizations have argued, it is a 
more effective way to secure rights for janajatis at the 
present moment than attempting to directly seize political 
power. 
As a strategy to gain political power at the national 
level, the MNO's participation in electoral politics as a small 
and unregistered party is of limited effectiveness. (We may 
also question the effectiveness a violent takeover of the 
state, the MNO's other plan.) At the village level, how-
ever, taking the format of political party has enabled the 
MNO to include people in its membership who are not 
brought into the janajati organizations . Political pa11ies are 
able to mobilize a wide sector of the population, because 
people can take part in them and align themselves with 
them simply by voting for them. Thus although MNO lead-
ers and activists come from among the tulo mane he of the 
village, ordinary villagers also consider themselves to be 
part of the MNO and call themselves "Mongols"- whereas 
they feel alienated from the social organizations which 
emphasize writings, formal speeches, and cultural entre-
preneurship. As one uneducated woman who supports the 
MNO and wasn't involved in the local Gurung organiza-
tion told me, "they probably only let people who can read 
or write take part in those organizations." So by being a 
political party the MNO is able to create space for a wide 
range of types of participation in the movement. Even 
though the MNO has a margi nal position in the movement 
at the national level because of its confrontational stance 
towards the state, at the village level it is able to create a 
kind of populist base. 
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The question of the extent to which the MNO is en-
gaged in the same project as the Janajati Mahasangh was a 
central topic of debate among MNO members. Since the 
Janajati Mahasangh as a coalition has a very limited pres-
ence in Ilam District, the debate focused on how the MNO 
should relate to the s ingle-ethnic group focused "social 
organizations" which compose the Janajati Mahasangh. 
Most MNO supporters perceived the work and goals of the 
social organizations and the MNO to be compatible, and 
mutually enhancing. Individuals asserted that the social 
organizations create support for the MNO by raising 
people's awareness and by encouraging Mongols to break 
away from Hinduism. Other people described how joining 
the MNO led them to get involved in the social organiza-
tions . The MNO encourages Mongols to become "not 
Hindu" and look for "their own language, religion and cul-
ture" but only the social organizations offer Mongols spe-
cific cultural identities. 
MNO leaders, however, criticized the social organiza-
tions and urged other leaders, in particular, to refrain from 
taking part in any of their activities or programs. First, MNO 
leaders argued that the social organizations' emphasis on 
promoting language, religion, and culture could mislead 
and confuse people into believing that this is the entire goal 
of activism. Uplifting Mongol languages and cultures is 
meaningless, they insisted, without the power to institu-
tionalize the use of these languages and cultures- "like 
growing cash crops without a market to sell them in ," as 
one MNO leader often explained. 
Second, the leaders criticized the social organizations 
for promoting individual ethnic group identities, rather than 
Mongols as a coalition, which could fracture the unified 
Mongol identity and politica l block. MNO leaders also 
expressed fear that if they participated in social organi za-
tions associated with single ethnic organizations, they could 
be seen as aligned with one ethnic group more than with 
other ethnic groups. As one leader stated, "We are fight-
ing for the freedom of all Mongols, not just one group." 
This ethnographic reading of the MNO raises some 
important issues in considering the janajati movement at 
large. It is important to remember that what may be an ef-
fective strategy for an organization at the national level 
may not be so effective at the village level, and vice versa. 
The challenge of creating a unified , concrete identity from 
a heterogeneous population without negating the multiple 
identities within the group is a critical issue for the janajati 
movement. It is also a central problem for all nationalist 
projects, and thus, examining the debates over this issue in 
this movement in Nepal can shed light on ethnic and na-
tionalist politics elsewhere. 
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Karl-Heinz Kramer 
Nepal's ethnic groups are still lack ing integrat ion and 
participation in the modern democratic Nepa li state. But 
their situat ion has, neverthe less, improved compared to 
pdnchayat times. The guarantee of fundamental rights is 
much safer today. Especially the right of freedom of opin-
ion and expression and the freedom to form organizations 
(article 12) have helped the ethnic elites to make their ar-
guments heard among their own groups and in the general 
public. 
The greatest problem is still the attitude of the Nepali 
state. There is hardly any organization outside the ethnic 
camp that really wants to understand the ethnic argumen-
tation. Politicians may be talking about participation of eth-
nic groups and suppressed castes, but the facts speak a dif-
ferent language, and there is hardly any change in attitude 
in sight. Another outstanding example are the human ri ghts 
organizations which have come into existence in greater 
number. They may be talking about indigenous groups, but 
like the political parties they, too, are dominated by mem-
bers of high Hindu castes, especially Bahuns. Many of these 
people cannot understand the arguments of the ethnic lead-
ers, since they have never learnt to view the Nepali state 
and society from the ethnic perspective because of the one-
sidedness of the national education system. 
Last month I have taken part in a conference organized 
by POLS AN in Kathmandu on the topic of "democratiza-
tion and development of civil society in Nepal". There I 
have presented a paper on this topic against the multiethnic 
background of the country. This paper dealt especially with 
the lega l si tuation on the one hand and the implementing 
politica l sphere on the other hand. Even though I had al-
ready chosen a moderate style of argumentation , my paper 
set off a controversial di scuss ion almost di sregarding the 
other partly very interesting papers. One Bahun (Dwarika 
Nath Dhungel) even turned my arguments on the problems 
of integration and participation into the opposite stating I 
wanted to disintegrate Nepal. And even in the press my 
arguments were distorted. Spotlight (issue of 26 January), 
for example, stated me to have argued that Nepalese ethnic 
groups are a threat to Nepal 's integrity supporting Dwarika 
Nath Dhungel 's biting critics that there is no reason to be-
lieve that there is any such threat of ethnic conflict. 
I take these reactions as proof that the ethnic argumen-
tation is having an effect. And with this I will turn over to 
the se t of themes derived from Bill 's and Susan's discus-
sions . If we speak about a ''janajati movement" then we 
must be aware, that we are not talking about a coherent 
movement but more about a general process of growing 
ethnic awareness. When we are talking here about the 
janajati , then we first of all think of Nepal's divergent eth-
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nic groups. But we must also be aware that in recent years 
these groups have been joined in their action by the so-
ca lled suppressed or untouchab le castes. All these groups 
have in common that they have been disadvantaged in the 
modern Nepali state in respect to legal ri ghts and to politi -
ca l, soc ial and economic participation. Even if it is not a 
single movement, all these groups, nevertheless, have a 
similar fate, similar intentions, goa ls, definitions and strat-
egies. And they have founded organizations of their own 
representing their interests against the Nepali state and its 
central elites. It thus makes sense to talk about a "janajati 
movement." 
Nevertheless I see some differences between those or-
ganizations that started with social issues and only became 
political in the second end (to these groups I especially 
count the organizations of the Nepal Janajati Mahasangh) 
and those organizations that predominantly work on a po-
litical basis and call themselves political parties, like the 
Mongol National Organization of Gopal Gurung. The lat-
ter again took a very radical stand when I met him last 
month, distancing himself from the current Nepali state. 
The groups of the Nepal Janajati Mahasangh take a much 
milder approach, even though one cannot deny that there 
are radical political figures also within that group. Suresh 
Ale Magar and Padma Ratna Tuladhar, for example, ac-
tively took part in celebrations of the NCP (Maoist) on the 
completement of three years of )ana yuddha that took place 
in New Delhi. 
Even though these persons differ from the argumenta-
tion ofGopal Gurung, who distances himself from a Gurung 
identity and instead speaks about a common Mongol iden-
tity of all Nepali ethnic groups, they have in common with 
him that they use their social ethnic engagements for the 
propagation of ajanajati political movement. Go pal Gurung 
may use the term Mongol instead of janajati, but in the 
end he is talking about the same thing. 
The introduction of the new constitution in 1990 of-
fered a chance not only to change the political system but 
also to reconsider the state's politics of nationalism. There 
can be no doubt that democracy has definitely entered Nepal 
in 1990 when the new constitution was promulgated. Sov-
ereignty exercised by the king for centuries was transfe1Ted 
to the people. The constitution fmther stipulated provisions 
like constitutional monarchy, a parliamentary form of gov-
ernment, a pluralistic society, and a civilian order. It also 
reinstated popular election of the parliament based on the 
principle of universal, equal, direct, and secret suffrage. 
But there are still a number of shortcomings within the 
constitution itself, and there still exist undemocratic laws 
enacted under the previous authoritarian regime requiring 
replacement or amendment. The guarantee of fundamental 
rights, like those of freedom of opinion and expression or 
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of organization, has opened up chances for ethnic political 
argumentation. Interestingly enough ethnic political par-
ties are a product of the 1990s and it was only after the 
people's movement that the socio-culturally oriented 
janajati organizations became politically active institutions, 
proving their groups as historic entities of a common Nepali 
state. It was especially the self-historification of the ethnic 
groups that provided them with political arguments in their 
dialogue with the Nepali state. 
Scholarly works on Nepal's ethnic movement are still 
in an infant state. It have especially been anthropologists, 
first foreigners later also Nepal is, who wrote about greater 
ethno-political consciousness and organizations. Foreign 
political scientists and historians working on Nepal are 
comparatively few in number, but among corresponding 
Nepali scholars a change in attitude can be observed in 
recent years. This becomes obvious when I compare the 
talks I had with them five years ago with their current ar-
gumentation. But it will take time. A special problem of 
Nepali scholars is that they still recrute themselves mostly 
from the Chetri and especially the Bahun groups. Under 
the panchayat system these persons represented the state 
ideology of politics, society and nationalism, and most of 
the controversial argumentation the ethnic organizations 
are confronted with today is still based on their writings. 
Ethnic and thus cultural difference, which has been accepted 
as given by the current constitution, is still challenged by 
many Nepali intellectuals, as I have mentioned in the be-
ginning. Political ethnic argumentation in recent years has 
mainly been focussed on this, let me call it stubborn, atti-
tude of leading Nepali scholars. Radical forces within the 
ethnic movement have already started to oppose them with 
militant demands and argumentations. Here I see a great 
danger for the future of the ethnic movement and of the 
Nepali state in general. 
The janajati movement must be seen as part of devel-
opment of civil society in Nepal. A well-developed civil 
society potentially influences government in two ways. It 
enhances political responsiveness by aggregating and ex-
pressing the wishes of the public through a wealth of non-
governmental forms of association, and it safeguards pub-
lic freedom by limiting the government's ability to impose 
arbitrary rule by force. Based on rights, rule of law, free-
dom and citizenship, civil society becomes the place for a 
critical rational discourse. It is a precondition for the exist-
ence of democracy and a property of democratic states and 
societies. 
The 1990 constitution with its guarantee of fundamen -
tal rights has laid the foundation for the start of this pro-
cess in Nepal. As such thejanajati movement must be seen 
in the context of similar movements of the so-called un-
touchable castes, the women, or even the Maoists as far as 
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their political arguments in favour of downtrodden sections 
of Nepali society are taken into consideration. But only a 
politically self-conscious civil society imposes limits upon 
state power. If the political practices of a self-conscious 
civil society transgress the boundaries of the state spon-
sored political discourse, a crisis of legitimacy of the state 
results. I hope today's discussions will shed some light on 
the question if such a crisis is given in Nepal. 
Lauren Leve 
Wellesley College 
Framing Religion, Politics and Culture in ]anajati Ac-
tivism: Lessons from Theravada Buddhism 
Are political revolutionaries and social reformers -
those who would take over the state and those who ask 
only for greater freedom to practice and reproduce what 
they see as their indigenous cultural identities - properly 
part of the same movement? One of the problems it was 
suggested that speakers might address today is conceptu-
alizing an interpretive framework for analyzing the diver-
sity of parties and practices that fall under the rubric of 
janajati politics . My remarks will be directed largely to 
this concern. In part, this approach is methodologically 
driven; unlike many of the others on this panel, I have not 
done fieldwork on janajati activism per se, nor have I 
worked with people who would identify themselves as in-
volved in this movement. Yet, the fact that many of these 
people do appear to me to be acting within the realm of 
cultural politics nevertheless, provides the root contradic-
tion that animates these comments. 
To begin, I propose a brief detour through the recent 
history of "religion" in the construction of the nation. As 
anyone who followed the debates that surrounded the draft-
ing and release of the VS 2047 (1991) Constitution will 
know, the current wave of public contestation over the place 
of Hinduism in the democratic nation-state began at the 
same time as, and in dialogue with, the rise of post-
Panchayat assertions of cultural and linguistic 
subnationalisms. Since 1990 (when I started doing field-
work in Nepal, and hence, when my ethnographic 
"memory," as it were, begins), protests and marches in fa-
vor of a secular state have given rise to publicized refusals 
to celebrate Dasain,6 and Hindu nationalist anxiety has 
grown, as manifested in the heightened visibility of mili-
tant Hindu associations like the VHP, and the increasing 
hostility being directed toward Christianity. Accusationsof 
6 See Pfaff-Czarnecka (1993) and Hangen (1997). 
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"Bahunbad" by public intellectuals, Buddhists andjanajati 
leaders have pointed to ways i!l which nationalized Hindu-
ism has masked and supported Monarchial power and high 
caste Hindu privilege. And Hindu nationalists and loyal-
ists have reacted aggressively in their own defense.7 Yet, 
· to the best of my knowledge, religious organizations that 
are not explicitly linked to an ethnocultural or political 
agenda are generally not construed as falling within the 
janajati sphere by activists or scholars, whether Nepali or 
foreign. This raises the question as to why language and 
culture are considered appropriate bases on which to claim 
political identity, whereas in the same context, religion is 
not. 
My research has been on a Theravada Buddhist reform 
movement which has clashed with the Nepali state in dif-
ferent ways at various times since the 1920s and 1930s 
when it first emerged among Newar Buddhists, and which 
has played an important part in re-articulating ethnic and 
religious identity for many Newars since then. Theravada 
Buddhists as a whole do not see themselves as appropri-
ately involved in janajati politics. Almost all will contest 
the assertion that Buddhism is in any way political; and the 
collaborations between Buddhist monks and janajati ac-
tivists that sprung up in the wake of thejana andolan were, 
and continue to be, fiercely debated within the Theravada 
community. Yet, I see important points of analogy between 
the Theravada Buddhist reform and thejanajati movement, 
and in the ways that Theravada Buddhists andjanajati ac-
tivists are positioned by and position themselves vis-a-vis 
the state. Thus it is instructive to compare their points of 
contiguity and common cause, as well as of divergence 
and disavowal. 
There are significant structural parallels between the 
Newar cultural renaissance/anti-Rana resistance at the be-
ginning of this century of which the early Theravada re-
form was a part, 8 and the politicization of ethnic and reli-
gious identity today. During the 1920s and 1930s, 
Theravada was a religious reform that had political impli-
cations in a state where political and religious subjectivities 
were intertwined. Thus, although its robed representatives 
never actually aspired to state power, their politics of cul-
ture were perceived by the Ranas as provocative nonethe-
less. Despite protestations that their undertaking was reli-
gious, not political, Theravada monks and nuns were ex-
pelled from Nepal twice in the first half of this century for 
ordaining Hindus and women, and preaching against such 
7 Many of these trends and events are also documented in 
Pfaff-Czarnecka ( 1997). 
8 See Gellner (1986; 1992:13-18; 1997), Lakaul (1985), Malia 
(1982), Pradhan (1985 (2041 VS)), Shrestha (n.d.), Upreti 
(1992). 
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cultural edifices as sacrifice and the caste system. At the 
same time, many of its lay devotees were jailed, fined, and 
harassed. 
The position ofTheravada Buddhists in relation to the 
state became less problematic after 1951, due in large part 
to King Tribhuvan's personal spiritual propensities.9 But 
in the months immediately following the jana an dolan, a 
number of prominent Theravada monks began to attend 
meetings of the Janajati Mahasangh, and they were among 
the leaders of the call for the constitutional recognition of 
Nepal's ethnic, linguistic and religious diversity that rocked 
Kathmandu over the summer and into the fall of 1990. At 
the same time as they were pressing for these political re-
forms, however, they were also active in a number of more 
religiously-orient~d l)Ctivities, including preaching dhanna 
at the meetings ofindividualjanajati associations, and or-
ganizing Buddhist training camps which aimed to propa-
gate their putatively "pure" brand of Buddhism among eth-
nic groups whose religions and cultures they argued had 
been "cmTupted" by a long history of Hindu domination. 
In conjunction with this goal, one monastery even atTanged 
the initiation of six young boys from what they explicitly 
publicized asjanajati castes- one Gurung, one Magar, one 
Tharu, and three Tamangs - as novice Theravada monks, 
and sent them to Thailand for high school and further Bud-
dhist training in the hope that they would return to spread 
Theravada Buddhism among their native communities. 
As it turned out, by 1996, four of the six boys had dis-
robed, rejecting their roles as representatives of their jats 
to return to normal teenage life. More significantly, most 
of the monks had broken with the Janajati Mahasangh by 
this time; as it was explained to me, because the organiza-
tion became "too political." Yet, considering that I had seen 
one of the very same monks who told me this in 1995 ral-
lying crowds at the Tundikhel in 1990, and that he himself 
had been one of the ones expelled in 1944, this assertion of 
an ontological distinction between the "religious" and "po-
litical" realms struck me as a strange denial of Theravada 
lived experience. Briefly, I interpret this opting out of eth-
nic politics at least in part as an act of resistance to events 
internal to janajati politics themselves- when the secular 
state initiative was defeated and their partner groups moved 
on to other issues and modes of organization, I suspect that 
the monks felt rather marginalized, and being able to claim 
a higher authority, under the sign of the religious, offered 
9 In the later part of his life, the King became extremely close 
to the knowledgeable and charismatic Theravada monk, 
Bhikshu Amritananda. For a brief period prior to the King's 
death, Theravada received explicit royal recognition and some 
state patronage as a result of Amritananda's influence . 
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an identity-appropriate language in which to voice this pro-
test.10 But the rhetoric makes sense only because these 
domains - religion and politics - had already been con-
structed as separate, and differentially valued, by the state. 
During the Panchayat period, the language of "religion" 
was appropriated by the state, which used it to represent 
itself as a domain of selflessness, service, and devotion to 
tradition, authority, and the collective good, including the 
traditional authmity represented by the King, whom offi-
cial nationalist discourse portrayed as affectively bound to 
his citizens, and as the foremost provider for the public 
good. (Just think of the billboard at Ratna Park on which 
King Birendra proclaims: "Just as I have affection for my 
country and my people, I have that same responsibility for 
my sick and hungry people." 11 ) At the same time, this moral 
and moralizing state was rendered opposed to the world of 
"politics," which was associated with political parties, and 
represented as an anti-nationalist realm of self-interest and 
greed. The result of this was the depoliticization of the state 
through its identification with - and embodiment as -
dharma, and the conesponding vilification of what came 
to be defined as "politics," a discursive production that 
continues to underlie much of what is and isn't recognized 
as "political" today. 
I would not propose this as a full explanation for the 
Theravada monks removing themselves from the avowed 
ethnopoliticallandscape. But it illustrates one outcome of 
the way that the Nepal state has historically positioned it-
self as a religious entity, and used Hindu tropes and cat-
egories in the process of governance. Religion is implicit 
in identity- and identity politics- in Nepal, even when it 
is not explicitly politicized in these terms. Even today, criti-
cal categories of belonging to the nation-state derive from 
and reference a Brahmanical world view. This underscores 
the importance of engaging with religion as an organizing 
factor in ethnic and nationalist politics . To do justice to the 
complex relations between nationalism, class andjanajati 
identity in Nepal today, it is important to insist on an ana-
lytical language that will make sense of the political di-
mensions of cultural assertions without assimilating 
ethnonationalism 12 to an economistic logic that assumes 
that the politics of identity are in fact about commanding 
resources and making material claims on the state, or oth-
10 Adams (1998) takes a similar approach in her analysis of the 
political uses and implications of discourses of science by 
medical doctors involved in thejana andolan . 
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"Jasari malai mero des a ra janatako mamata cha, usai gari 
bhok ra rogle pidita mero janataprati mero jimmedari cha. Sri 
Pane Birendra." 
12 I take this expression from Tambiah ( 1996). 
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erwise reducing religion to politics by other means. 
What does this have to do with delineating an analyti-
cal space for contemplating religion, politics, and culture 
injanajati activism? In comparing Theravada Buddhist and 
other janajati organizations, I am not proposing that 
Theravada Buddhism is the same as the MNO or the Newar 
member-groups of the Janajati Mahasangh (with whom 
in some cases it shares members). Nor would I claim that 
this very partial commentary addresses the whole of the 
problem. I have tried to make two points in this presenta-
tion: first, that interpreting cuiTent events in the janajati 
field requires broadening conventional definitions of what 
counts as political. "Culture" is not merely about social 
identity, but also pm1icipates in defining the category of 
"the political" itself. Hence, analyses of the relations be-
tween politics and culture must be ready to open up inher-
ited definitions of what counts as political action, even when 
this departs from the self-appraisals of activists and others 
who may also act as anthropological informants. My th ink-
ing here has been influenced by Partha Chatte1jee's (1986) 
reading of the history of anti-colonial nationalism in India, 
in which he proposes that the period of social and religious 
reforms that preceded the articulation of nationalism as a 
political movement must be seen as a constitutive stage of 
that event. Ongoing debates in Nepal recognize language, 
culture and religion as mutually implicated vehicles through 
which the Shah-Rana state has defined and dominated its 
diverse subject peoples. Here, where collective identities 
have emerged in dialogue with the classificatory systems 
and policies of the Hindu nation-state, seem·ingly apoliti-
cal processes of religious and cultural transformation are 
indeed integral aspects of contesting state power. 
As a second, related point, I have proposed that schol-
arly analyses of cultural identity in Nepal should be atten-
tive to the complex politics of religion, not only as iden-
tity, but also as discourse. An objectified notion of "reli-
gion" has played a critical - if as yet mainly unstudied-
role in configuring janajati identities and activities in a 
context where identity categories have historically been 
defined along religious lines. Finding appropriate concep-
tual frames to guide future inquiry is an important step to-
wards producing a relevant and informed anthropology of 
ongoing process of identify formation, cultural politics, and 
activism. This task calls for further engagement with the 
complex role of religion in constituting ethnic, national, 
and nationalist identity. 
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David Holmberg 
Department of Anthropology 
Cornell University 
Ethnic Movements in Contemporary Nepal 
The comments I make today are based on collabora-
tive research I have done and continue to do with Kathryn 
March and Mukta Singh Tamang both of whom are speak-
ing at today's roundtable. I want to further acknowledge 
the important contributions to this work made by my long 
term research associate, Suryaman (Himdung) Tamang and 
Amrit Yhonjan of Tamang Language and Literacy Coun-
cil. 
I. I should preface my remarks today with the qualifi-
cation that they are Tamang-o-centric. The first point I 
make is historical. Ideologies of difference in contempo-
rary Nepal transform those which took form with the con-
solidation of the Hindu state of Nepal in the late 18th cen-
tury. Nepal formed, for Tamang, in the exercise of violent 
force by high-caste, Indo-Nepalese who deployed a hierar-
chical ideology conflating caste and ethnicity to organize 
diversity. Tamang were conceived of as low, beef-eating, 
Buddhists, subject to enslavement, unfit for military duty, 
capable primarily of physical labor, and, in the west, sub-
ject to regimes of compulsory labor or rakam. In a word, 
the history of Nepal is not one of the phulbaari or "gar-
den" of the discretely flourishing blossoms of Prithvi 
Narayan Shah but of domination of discrete sectors of the 
Nepalese population by an elite. The term phulbaari, ac-
tive in discourse about ethnicity in Nepal at least since the 
fall of the Ran as in 2007 I 1950, must be seen as part of the 
continuing quest for an ideology of difference but one 
which, in the contemporary context, disguises the 
infrastructural reality of relations of domination and sub-
ordination in Nepal. In Pierre Bourdieu's terminology, it 
constitutes an active misrecognition of relations of domi-
nation. Contemporary janajati movements are a continua-
tion of a history of opposition to relations of domination 
and the ideologies that support them. 
II. My second point relates to the larger transforma-
tions in political and cultural discourse that followed the 
collapse of the Rana regime and the reconstruction of old 
orders of domination in the panchayat era and led to the 
liberalizations succeeding the People's Movement and the 
new constitution in 1990. In reference to the western 
Tamang, identity politics did exist in the past. Communi-
ties produced themselves as collectivities around local head-
men and in opposition to the outside, especially the royal 
regime of the Ran as/Shahs and the system of c01·vee labor, 
in extensive and elaborate Buddhist rituals which gener-
ated power both symbolic and real in local communities. 
During this period, there was no possibility for wider orga-
nization under the rubric of"Tamangness." What we think 
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of as Tamang areas were involuted, cellular like units tied 
in chains not unlike the chains of dialects ofTamang lan-
guage. During the period of the 1950s and 1960s after the 
collapse of the Rana regime, there were more organized 
political actions based on identity to the northwest of 
Kahmandu. Inspired in part by organizers for the Con-
gress Party, local communities of Tamang who were se-
verely oppressed by in-migrating Bahun , rioted and looted . 
These Bahun had, at least in Tamang recountings, acquired 
land and local political influence through legal manipula-
tions that were only possible because of their association 
with dominant powers . In 1960 anti-Brahman riots oc-
curred in what are now Nuwakot and Dhading districts 
where Tamang villagers looted and drove out all Brahman 
families from several villages. Troops killed and wounded 
several Tamang and arrested hundreds. Mahendra used 
the presence of these "Brahman refugees" in Kathmandu 
as one of the pretexts for dissolving the first democrati-
cally elected govemment in 2017 v.s. and banned, one can 
presume not incidentally, the first Tamang cultural asso-
ciation which had been organized by Santabir Lama in 2013. 
Contemporary janajati organizations among Tamang 
are a new urban-based movements which became possible 
only after liberalizations of the new constitution. They are 
distinguishable from earlier identity politics because they 
are Kathmandu-based, nation-wide efforts at organization 
inspired by transnational rhetorics of nation, diversity, in-
digenousness, and identity especially those current in 
greater India . The leading Tamang ethnic organizations 
have distinct political leanings if not party affiliations . 
Although these organizations are based in Kathmandu, they 
are beginning to influence local communities in signifi-
cant ways. For instance, Tamang in the area we work, have 
abandon ned the celebration Dasain as a Hindu festival and 
are focussing on making Buddhist /hosar a focal context 
for asserting Tamang culture in a broader alliance with eth-
nic associations like the Gurung who have developed , in 
some areas at least, an anti-Dasain/Tihar which is celebrated 
at village and district cultural centers at the time of Gurung 
Lhosar. Buddhism is in many respects the rallying point 
for broad opposition but is confounded, I should note, by 
mass Tamang conversions to Christianity in some regions. 
In the urban/village contrast, one must note the fol-
lowing: 
1. The diversity of peoples called Tamang is substantial in 
both language and culture due to the history of isolation 
and regional involution . The creation of pan-Tarnang iden-
tity is an urban based political cum cultural effort at a new, 
synthetic iden 
tity. 
2. Concerns with the preservation ofTamang language and 
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culture are primarily the concern of Tamang residentially 
displaced to Kathmandu or the Terai where issues of na-
tion and diversity are especially sa lient. 
3. At present, party division and longstanding political fac-
tions in village communities are more influential in village 
life than ethnic associations at least in the western Tamang 
areas where Tamang are the dominant population. 
My final point is brief and meant to lead into the com-
ments of my collaborators. Colonial typologies of caste 
and tribe atticulated early on by scholars like Btian Hodgson 
set the stage for modern anthropology which started off in 
a unproblematic acceptance of the basic terms of those 
typologies. These typologies, it turns out, are largely con-
sistent with those of Hindu state ideologies leading to a 
curious triangulation in the representation of difference in 
Nepal where Hindu colonizers produced categories of dif-
ference which incorporated non-Indo-Nepalese which were 
then applied in principle in the formative ethnology of 
Nepal. These categories ironically are in significant mea-
sure the nodes of contemporary janajati organization which 
are constructed as challenges to the models of the Hindu 
state. They have led furthermore to the charge that anthro-
pologists, particularly those of the western persuasion, are 
fanning the flames of ethnicity. It is common for high 
caste intellectuals and elite of Nepal to debunk the ethnic 
movements as "constructed" but to debunk these move-
ments is to attempt to disempower groups historically de-
nied power in Nepal at the very moment they begin to ex-
ercise power in a challenge to the old order. An appercep-
tion of conditions of differential power based on group 
membership is essential to ethnic peace in Nepal and must 
begin not in the denials and defensiveness that are so com-
mon among dominant sectors of the population but in ac-
ceptance of the reality of differential power and continu-
ing superordinate position of certain heriditary groups. 
Mukta S. Tamang 
Representation of Diversity in School Textbooks: 
Implications for Politics of Culture and Identity in Nepal 
I would like to discuss the issue of how cultural diver-
sity is being represented in school textbooks in Nepal and 
what are its implications in the politics of culture and iden-
tity in the country. The existing school textbooks, as one 
of the state-owned devices, evoke the concept of diversity 
to create a harmonious national culture, at the same time 
reifying difference by categorizing peoples with particular 
dispositions. Various ethnic activists have challenged the 
ex isting state renderings of divers ity for their representa-
tions in school textbooks and other public media . They 
contend that the conceptualization of the multicultural re-
ality of Nepal in dominant natTatives legitimizes the hege-
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monic Hindu order. The contest over what diversity and 
nationalism constitute forms one of the core elements in 
contemporary politics of cu lture and identity in Nepal. 
Given the cunent literacy rate in Nepal, which is only 
about 39% of the total population, school education can 
have only limited influence in generating consc iousness of 
national scope. Nevertheless, formal education provides a 
ground for produc ing a group of dominant elite who are 
able to perpetuate the power to control the statecraft and 
produce and reproduce consciousness, including that of 
diversity and nationalism. The debate on strategies in terms 
of both contents and media for gradually universalizing 
schooling in Nepal, for example, has provided a forum for 
encounters between Janjati discourse and previously domi-
nant views. School textbooks comprise one important state-
deployed means reflecting the negotiated results of such 
debate. 
School textbooks, particularly the Nepali primers titled 
Mahendra Mala, and social studies from their beginning, 
introduce Nepal to children with quotes from King Prithvi 
Narayan Saha. A famous quote which goes "Nepal is a 
garden of four vama and thirty six jat" (~ ""ffi" 'l1'f ~ 
~ 'fi<1cfRT it) is found across the books of various grades. 
The quote is understood and interpreted in dominant mod-
ern Nepali discourse as recognition of cultural diversity 
and an endorsement of the policy of harmony and co-ex-
istence. 
Along this line, Prayag Raj Sharma ( 1997), for example, 
suggests that the idea of cultural diversity has been a part 
of and implicit in Nepal 's historical legacy. He further sug-
gests that the state has done a great deal to create a collec-
tive consciousness of cultural diversity as a positive value. 
Some of the descriptions in textbooks glorifying plural-
ism, appear to support the idea that the government is com-
mitted to fostering the notion of harmony and co-existence 
in multicultural and multi -lingual Nepal. One example of 
such text, found in a social studies book for grade 7, tells 
the children the followin g: 
Nepal is a country like a beautiful garden ... She is 
so beautiful because of the existence of peoples with 
many different castes, ethnicities, religions, customs 
and qualities. (ln11'r ~ ~:GW ~ ~ ~ it ."lffit 
~ ~ ~. '11'f, mt, ~' TJUm ~erR·~~ 
~ !!fu -mit ~ itt) 
The understanding of diversity, however, cannot be seen 
separate from the project of national integration. The five 
year plan for education in Nepal prepared in 1956, for ex-
ample, stated its rationale as to "develop a system of edu-
cation that is national in character and suited to the genius 
of the people and to develop citizenship in all Nepalis." 
Similarly, the new education plan of 1971 states that 
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" ... Nepalese society will not lead to national solidarity and 
independent sovereign nationhood without [a) central guid-
ance in planned socialization (aimed) at coordinating the 
various economjc and social interests, harmonizing diverse 
multi -lingual traditions into a single nationhood." 
How does centrally guided planned socialization har-
monize diverse traditions? How are mutually contradic-
tory concepts of diversity and national integration articu-
lated in dominant conceptions? To bring down these con-
tradictory concepts of diversity and uniformity to the level 
of comprehension of children, the children have been told 
as follows: 
Development of feelings that 'we are Nepali, Nepal 
is our country' will foster our nationalism. (Nllt ~ 
if, ~ liTI'.iT ~T lit ·qn'f ·~ ~ liTI'.iT <lf1sall\11i!>l 
fWl>m ~ 1) 
Nepal is our birth place. We are all Nepali. We 
have no discrimination. We all are subjects of one 
country. (~ liTI'iT ;J[rll ·@r lit 1 wtT ~ 'it<mfr if 1 ~ 
<R ikmcr ~ 1 wtT ~ ~T<!>T ~ \I'OlT if 1) 
Through these lessons children learn about themselves 
as members of a single and unified nation. National inte-
gration, therefore, is an extended version of P.N. Saha's 
physical unification, bringing diverse cultural, social and 
economic spheres under control of the state. To meet the 
further demand of modern nation building, children have 
been taught several other unifying elements such as the 
state prescribed slogan "our kjng, our country; our language, 
our dress" (liTI'il ~ liTI'iT hr, liTI'iT 'llf!'IT liTI'iT -il>r) and a set of 
national symbols drawn from Hindu symbology and ac-
tive kingship (cow, flag, red blob, crown, royal crest, coat 
of arms, scepter, royal standard, and national anthem). One 
of the most illuminating text descriptions spread across 
children's books reads as follows: 
(Nepal is the name of our country. We all are Nepali 
who live in Nepal. There are peoples of many dif-
ferent jar (caste). Bahun, Chhetri, Newar, Gurung, 
Magar, Rai, Limbu are jars. There are other jars as 
well. Despite many jars, we have one kjng. We 
have one country. All jat do not fo llow the same 
religion. Some worship Shiva, some worship Bud-
dha, some worship Bishnu and some Devi. In Nepal 
all are called Hindu.) e'rfr, ;t<m-, Tf<>SO, ~. lfiR, m, 
fi;rKr ·qn'f ;;n(f lit I ffi 31'(> ;;n(f <rf.r ~ WT I "'"fu ;;n(f ·~ 
<rf.r liTID ~ ~ WT I liTI'.iT l1<'!<F ~ ~ ~ I ~ ;;n(f ~ 
u-.f ~I ;R ~~ 'l'i!T ~. ;R ~.<A~~ ;R 
~'l'i!T~, l~lll ~~·~l 
The following statement gives an example of further 
reifying the glory of unification, through a textbook lesson 
to children: 
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Prithvi Narayan Saha is the founder of modern 
Nepal. Had he not unified the weak and disputing 
small nations of the country, we would not have 
been ab le to identify ourse lves as Nepali be longing 
to Nepal. ('f«fi 'lT(Tl:l1l[ '<fm ~ <rrr ~ li'r 1 ~ 
< m"'T m"'T ~ (l,-1l6~<11~ ~ ~ ~ -.rc:rifhfu~ m:; 
3IT'iT ~ ~ < 'it<mfr 'l1"f 'ffi'f.'t P<n:MT I) 
This account makes inv isible the conquered popula-
tion and creates a myth of pre-unification Nepal consisting 
of ethnic populations as "weak others" who frequently 
fought with each other. Sporadic narratives of Nepal's dif-
ferent cultural groups included in various editions of the 
school textbooks since the 1960s, while giving the impres-
sion of fairer representation of diversity, often portray eth-
nic communities in a stereotypic mode. Either through a 
asymmetrical caste-based or modern development-based 
evolutionary perspective, the ethnic communities are por-
trayed as backward populations with particular kinds of 
socia l, cu ltural and economic dispositions at the bottom 
rung of the socia l ladder (Pigg 1992). 
Diversity in this national integrative framework be-
comes an ideology of domination by inclusion. As an ide-
ology, it has constantly been manipulated and adjusted by 
the ruling elites in Nepal to perpetuate the unequal power 
structure. As Harka Gurung (1998) succinctly puts it, di-
versity to the homogenizing state of the dominant Hindu 
elites means "variation (of the peoples) not only in genus 
and species but also in status and privileges ordained by 
the law of the land, Muluki Ain (1854)". The unequal sta-
tus is characterized by economic exploitation, political 
oppression and cultural marginalization. In the educational 
sector, for example, 96% of the school textbook writers 
come from high caste hill Bahun, Chhetri and Newar com-
munities and those groups accounting for 70% of the 
country's total graduates. 
The discourse on diversity produced by means of edu-
cation, therefore, subtly but vehemently undermines the 
possibility of co-existence within a plural society. As chil-
dren of imagined communities, school students in Nepal 
are misinformed and taught to see themselves as members 
of the Hindu national community in order to promote na-
tional integration (Anderson 1983, Gellner 1983, Chaterjee 
1993) . Integrative framework with hegemonic content 
would view ethnic plurality as a deterrent to co-existence 
rather than as a possibility fo r mutuality. 
Violence to the concept of true diversity by the state 
over the last two centuries can be taken as a common gen-
esis of the Janajati movement in Nepal. Although ethnic 
organizations and political parties such as MNO, Janjati 
Mahasangha, and Jan Mukti Morcha have a varieties of 
approaches and goals ranging from effective implementa-
tion of constitutional provisions to radical structural 
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changes, their concems are fundamentally directed toward 
transformations of existing understanding and practice of 
cultural diversity in Nepal. 
Judith Pettigrew 
Comments 
Tamu Pye Llw Sangh (TPLS) ("Tamu Religious and 
Cultural Organisation") is a Pokhara based Tamu (Gurung) 
organisation. Tamu Pye Lhu Sangh 's self-appointed man-
date is to preserve and revitalise Tamu cultural traditions 
and in particular the shamanic traditions of the pachyu, 
klehbri and "bonist lama" .13 The organisation was founded 
in Pokhara in late 1990 by seven men all of whom are ex-
British Gurkha soldiers/officers. The founder members are 
shamans, sons of shamans or members of shamanic clans. 
Earlier in that year two of the founder members had trav-
elled into the uplands in an attempt to discover if the places 
chanted by pachyu shamans during theii· journey to escort 
the soul(s) of the dead to the afterworld, which is also the 
Tamu downward migration route, existed in the physical 
landscape. Their discovery that "text" matched landscape 
formed the basis for a movement to revitalise the declining 
and threatened shamanic traditions which culminated in 
the founding of TPLS in November 1990. 
TPLS now have branches throughout west-central 
Nepal and also in Kathmandu. Their kohinbo "shamanic 
monastery" in Pokhara, whose architecture is based on 
shamanic symbology contains a museum and also serves 
as a cultural centre, a site for shamanic rituals, an office 
and a meeting place. It's design has been reproduced in 
miniature in several locations in different districts. The 
organisation's activities include among others the celebra-
tion of Lhosar ("Tamu New Year" celebrated on 15 Poush 
(end of December), the hosting of death and other shamanic 
rituals at the kohinbo, the organisation of and participation 
in local and national Tamu conferences and the ongoing 
search for sacred geography. TPLS members are also in-
volved in a community archaeology and ethno-history 
project with researchers from the Universities of Cambridge 
and Central Lancashire. 
TPLS members state very clearly that they are a reli-
gious organisation and not a political one ("we are on the 
religious side not the political side"). They explain that the 
shamanic traditions are under threat from Buddhism, that 
young people no longer want to train to be shamans, that 
138onistlbonpo lama is the term TPLS members apply to the la-
mas who conduct death rituals in collaboration with the shamans 
and like them include animal sac.rifice as an integral element of 
their practice. In the villages they are called "purano" "old" la-
mas in contrast the the "naya" "new" Tibetan Buddhist lamas). 
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townspeople are losing their language and that people are 
forgett ing how to "do things the Tamu way". In essence 
people are forgetting about the cultural centrality of the 
shamanic traditions and TPLS have taken on the role of 
reminding them "so that we don't lose our culture". By 
reminding Tamus of the centrality of the shamanic tradi-
tions TPLS simultaneously remind people that they are not 
Hindu, that the Tamu-mai have a northern origin and that 
contained within the Pye ta Lhu ta is the "correct" ve rsion 
of hi story. They remind people that Tamu history was re-
written by Hindus in the 17th Century and that in the re-
writing one group of clans became constructed as 'supe-
rior' and the other as 'inferior'. The clans according to the 
shamans pye are equal "there is no superior and no inferior 
among the Tamu-mai". TPLS's stance on the relationship 
between the clans, while widely supported at an overt level 
particularly in the towns, is contested often covertly by those 
Tamu-mai who perceive a hierarchical relationship to ex-
ist. While membership of TPLS is free and open to all 
Tamus ("by birth all Tamus are members") in reality not 
everyone would want to be involved. 
In spite of TPLS's claim that they are a cultural and 
religious organisation their activities clearly also have a 
political dimension. Their concem over loss of cultural 
knowledge , language, and religious infringement is 
matched by a concern to re-socialise a version of the past 
based on shamanic knowledge which directly contests 
Hindu interpretations of Tamu history, provides the basis 
for the assertion of a Tamu identity which is non-Hindu, 
and addresses the contentious issue of clan hierarchy. 
Mary Cameron 
Department of Sociology and Anthropology 
Auburn University 
Ironies in the Janajaati Movement and the Politicizing 
of Ethnography in Nepal: Some Cautionary Remarks 
As an anthropologist and writer on lower castes in far 
western Nepal, I, like the people I work with, often feel I 
am outside looking in on what is written about Nepali cul-
ture. In this regard, I find the recent attention to so-called 
'janajaati,' and the rapidity with which the term has en-
tered Himalayan academic discourse, remarkable. When I 
first heard the word janajaati, I translated it as "people," 
(as did many Nepali colleagues and friends unaware of"the 
movement" since it literally means 'people groups.' Ad-
mittedly in the past I have worked exclusively in a village 
instead of the rarified political atmosphere of Kathmandu, 
I rely on spoken rather than written texts to understand 
people and their culture, and I refer mostly to the history of 
caste discrimination, the experience of bodily rejection 
imposed on those of lower caste, and the process of disen-
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franchisement. I wondered, based on my translation of 
j anajaati, was there now a unification movement in which 
all barriers would be broken, a sort of second stage people's 
movement following on the heels of the first? Would Nepal 
again distinguish itself, following a relatively nonviolent 
res toration of democracy, as a country that could bring its 
myriads of people together? Would caste barriers be bro-
ken, not through government quotas but through the 
people's will? The answer is no . The janajaati movement 
spoken of by the few mostly men involved in it, and their 
social science mouthpieces is, like the groups claiming 
membership, difficult to place boundaries around . What is 
ev ident about the so-called janajaati movement, however, 
is that it presents many ironies that need pointing out. To 
call this era in Nepal's history the janajaati-yug, as was 
done recently in an article in SINHAS, is short-sighted and 
political, and does not, in my estimation, represent the sig-
nificant movements taking place in Nepal. At a time when 
international dollars and Foucaultian ideas help to consti-
tute the practices by which groups in Nepal make their 
boundaries and stake their identity claims, the recently 
coined term janajaati should not be used uncritically as an 
indigenous term. For in fact its circulation seems exclu-
sively Kathmandu-based, and its translation as "ethnic 
minority" is transparently of western politics . 
Concerned that I was unaware of something important 
about to happen as the next era of anthropology in Nepal 
unfolded (after all, a yug is a long time), I did a quick study 
of the janajaati phenomenon dming the last weeks of my 
own research this past summer. I interviewed some promi-
nent and controversial Tamang and Thakali leaders, asked 
Nepali friends and colleagues what they thought of the 
movement, and attended a UN-sponsored conference in 
Kathmandu on the world 's indigenous people (in Nepali, 
aadibaasi). The latter event was most revealing. The promi-
nent members of the janajaati movement allended it, and 
gave speeches using the two tetms interchangeably. Though 
everyone had the UN guidelines for the identification and 
protection of the world's indigenous people (those whose 
cultures are at threat of ex tinction due to political, eco-
nomic and environmental upheaval), the groups in Nepal 
to whom 'indigenous' clearly applies in this sense, the 
Chepang and Santa!, were glaringly absent from the pro-
ceedings. I wondered throughout the short conference if 
the UN would accept the indigenous status of those mak-
ing speeches. 
From this admittedly short exploration, there aie four 
points I would like to make about the politics ofthejanajaati 
movement in Nepal. First, it is unclear who qualifies as an 
ethnic minority. Leaders have established criteria of what 
a j anajaati is, but these are debatable on several grounds. 
An important criterion is an indigenous status, and it is on 
this basis that the janajaati movement has justified its par-
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ticipation in the UN-sponsored indigenous people's move-
ment. A second criterion is a ru story of state-sponsored dis-
crimination based on ethnicity (religion, language, soc ial 
organization), in the pas t and now; this is the thrust behind 
the politics of the movement. They often characterize the 
latter as hav ing been "conquered" by another dominant 
group (read Hindus). However, the first criterion of indig-
enous status is difficult to prove, and does not always pre-
suppose the second one of discrimjnation. For example, 
while the Newars are the indisputable indigenous people 
of Kathmandu, they are not particularly interested in the 
janajaati movement, perhaps because as a group they are 
relatively successful. The ease of identifying the largest 
ethnic group in Nepal, the Newar, ends with it. All other 
groups' origins are less than clear, a fact that keeps the 
janajaati movement ambiguous and questionable to those 
on the outside. Are the Sherpa an ethnic minority, accord-
ing to the movement's criteria? If so, on what basis? They 
are not indigenous people, and it is unclear which of their 
rights have been violated. The people of Mustang do not 
really know what to call themselves . They reject the term 
'bhotay', and many have simply adopted the last name 
Lama.Are the Thakah a bounded ethnic minority or an in-
digenous group? Hard to prove, since some claim that the 
Thakali as a group is less than a hundred years old, having 
chosen their name from the Thak Kola near where they 
live. What about the Khaas of far western Nepal? They are 
an ancient group in Nepal, yet one would be hard pressed 
to locate them in the centuries of intermarriage that have 
charactetized their rustory. Finally, groups who are the most 
endangered, the Chepang and the Santa!, are only margin-
ally involved in either the janajaati or aadibaasi movements. 
Second, as has already been pointed out, the move-
ment conflates janajati with adibasi . 
Third, the movement's leaders seek to correct what they 
rightfully claim has been state-supported and legislated 
discrimination (within the army, the schools, etc.) against 
certain groups. They want equal treatment under the law. 
Here, regrettably, I find the greatest irony of the so-called 
janajati movement. For while on the one hand their legiti-
macy claims cite discrimination toward them, most if not 
all these groups have themselves, over the decades and 
centuries, adopted the most discriminatory practice of Hin-
duism, social, economic and religious marginalizing of 
lower castes. When I pressed janajaati leaders on this point, 
they said that at times in their history adopting certain Hindu 
practices was necessary, such as untouchability, or risk os-
tracism and possible imprisonment. In effect, because they 
felt dominated, they also needed to dominate. Would they, 
then, welcome the most oppressed groups, the untouch-
ables, into their movement? Lower castes would techni-
cally meet the criteria of janajaati participation- oppres-
sion by a dominant group, development of their own Ian-
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guage, state-supported discrimination. When asked, the 
janajaati leaders thought they would not want them in-
volved, since untouchables have their own dalit organiza-
tions. Would they consider relinquishing their own discrimi -
natory practices for the obvious contradiction they present · 
to the ir own movement? They, again , thought not because 
of the present culture of Nepal. It is these sorts of contra-
dictions that ethnographers of the janajati movement need 
to consider. 
Turning to my last point, and the final irony of the 
janajaati movement is its sexism . They mostly exclude 
women. On this point, leaders (men) claim that janajaati 
women are equal to men, within their cultural groups, and 
therefore not in need of equal protection under the law. In 
contrast to these claims, though, anthropologists of ethnic 
minorities in Nepal have not concluded that women have 
equal status in all the groups, though often they have greater 
economic power than their high caste Hindu counterparts. 
Though under current Nepali law women still cannot in-
herit land equally with men, leaders in the women's move-
ment find little participation from women of ethnic mi-
norities. 
I would caution against assuming a Nepali-wide and 
vibrantjanajati movement that is indigenous and well sup-
ported by the people, or that proposes viable measures to 
right the wrongs imposed on non-Hindus . The Nepali gov-
ernment has changed many of its discriminatory laws, and 
has introduced school texts in ethnic languages such as 
Maithili, with more in the works. The govemment has done 
little, however, to end two entrenched forms of discrimi-
nation- against lower castes (16-20% of Nepal's popula-
tion) and against women . It is the dalit and women's move-
ments, as well as the growing efforts to protect Nepal's 
environment, that I feel are significant movements with 
lasting consequences for large numbers of people. 
Kathryn March 
Triangulating Tamang ethnohistory: the production of 
identities in colonial encounters (a collaborative project 
of David Holmberg, Kathryn March, Mukta Singh Tamang, 
and Amrit Yonjan) 
Introduction and general scope of the project 
Brian Hodgson served the British Ernpit:e during much 
of the first half of the 19th century, first in India, then Nepal. 
He was one of those remarkable civil servants who not only 
administered British rule, but also imagined himself a 
scholar, learning several languages and researching a wide 
variety of topics-about wildlife, botany, linguistics, reli-
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gion and society. His writings influenced the course of 
South Asian studies profoundly. Among his unpublished 
papers, archived in the India Office Library, is "Murmiharu 
ko kulachar" (~ ~) or, as he rendered the titl e 
hirnself, 'Manners and customs of the Murmi .' 1 'Murmi' 
is the name Hodgson appli ed to (at least some of) the 
peoples today known in the central Himalayas as 'Tamang.' 
Tamang, today, number some 600,000 persons, living 
throughout the middle hills of Nepal, making them the larg-
est single ethnic (formerly known as 'tribal') group in 
Nepal. Tamang peoples came originally from the central 
Asian plateaus to become peasant subsistence agricultur-
alists in Nepal. They speak dialects closely related to Ti-
betan, practice Buddhism and respect its textual specialist 
lama-s, as well as embracing a vigorous shamanic tradi-
tion. Unlike lowland Nepali society, Tamang communi-
ties are not organized along caste lines, according to which 
endogamous groups are explicitly ranked in terms of titual 
purity and occupational pollution; instead, Tamang have 
unranked exogamous clans. Tamang incorporation into 
modern Nepal has been problematic: for two hundred years, 
Tamang rents, taxes and especially con1ee labor were es-
sential to the creation of the state of Nepal, but Tamang 
peoples have been otherwise excluded from modern op-
portunities, such as education, civil service, and mercenary 
military service by the social, religious and political prac-
tices of the Hindu state. Nepal nationalists are proud of 
the fact that Nepal was never colonized by any outside 
forces; Tamang nationalists grapple with a history of con-
siderable internal colonization by caste Nepali forces. 
Hodgson's folio Murmiharu ko kulachar, dated Saturday, 
Jesth I, 1904 BS (Bikram Sambat =ca. 1847 AD) is part of 
the MSS Eur Hodgson (Vol 56: folios 64-78); it comprises 
fourteen oversized pages handwritten in somewhat archaic 
Nepali and is without question the oldest documentary evi-
dence specifically about Tamang cultural practice. 
"Murmiham ko kulachar" is a fascinating document. 
It was produced in a three-party interaction: Brian Hodgson, 
working with and through a literate scribe-assistant, to in-
terview a Tamang man from a village to the north and east 
of the Kathmandu Valley. The proposed collaborative 
project has two primary aspects: first, to glean from the 
document itself all possible evidence about the three indi-
viduals involved and their respective investments in their 
interchange and, second, to analyze interviews of contem-
porary Tamang individuals regarding the document, its 
details and significance. The overarching objectives are to 
refine anthropological understanding of colonialism to in -
clude the role of dominant elites in processes of internal 
1 MSS Eur Hodgson Vol 56: folios 64-78, dated Saturday, Jesth 
I , 1904 VS (1847 AD). 
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colonialism, to add to our understanding of the genesis, 
codification and contemporary redeployment of Tamang 
identity, to explore possibilities for integrating scholarly 
work constructively with Tamang cultural revival move-
ments and ethnic identity politics, and, finally to further 
clarify the importance of working collaboratively with lo-
cal Tarnang including activists to collect, interpret, make 
public, and preserve their cultural artifacts. 
The document and its significance for understanding 
Tamang ethnic identity 
As a written text, "Murmiharu ko kulachar" follows 
many of the conventions of government documents from 
Nepal of the same period: the way in which it is dated, 
framed and scrupulously identifies its interviewee not only 
by name, but by locality. The rest of the document out-
lines a sequence of major life cycle rituals, beginning with 
childbitih rites and ending with funerary ones, with con-
siderable attention to ritual detail. A careful reading of this 
document reveals traces of all three of its original inter-
locutors. Although it is written largely as a monologic 
record of statements attributed to the Tamang interviewee, 
it shows clear traces both of the structure of Hodgson's 
questions and of the interventions of the translator-scribe. 
The surface contours of the document, then, can be read to 
unravel some of the mysteries of its production at the in-
tersection of three differently interested parties. 
Hodgson (born 1800 - died 1894) began his career in 
1816 in the Indian Civil Service, aiTiving in India in 1817. 
From 1820-1842, he served as the first official British Resi-
dent and, at the time virtually only, European to live in 
Kathmandu. After a brief return to England, Hodgson came 
back to retire and continue to work on his scholarly papers 
from 1844-1858 in Dmjeeling, which must have been where 
the interview for this "Murmiharu ko kulachar" document 
took place. We know something of Hodgson's style of work 
from his primary biographer, Hooker, and from Hodgson's 
own reports (in Miscellaneous Essays Vol 2): he appar-
ently liked to prepare lists of questions in advance, then 
allow a pundit in his employ to pose the questions and 
record the answers; although Hodgson is not reported to 
speak much during these exchanges, he was allegedly of-
ten physically present. His questions clearly reflect both 
British colonial concerns and his own scholarly understand-
ings of South Asian society. 
We know something in general about Hodgson's assis-
tants, although not about the specific assistant working with 
him on "Murmiharu ko kulachar." According to contem-
porary scholars in Nepal, Hodgson regularly employed at 
least three known assistants, each of whom had a signifi-
cant career as pundits, writers and intellectuals in his own 
right: Khardar Jit Mohan was named as Hodgson's scribe 
for the intluentiall848 survey; Arnritananda was appointed 
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as the official Pundit for the British Residency and is the 
author of an 1831 AD grammar of his own right (as de-
scribed in work by his descendant Kamal P. Malia; Shiva 
Sankar, too, seems to have been a frequent translator for 
Hodgson (and accompanied the eminent Prime Minister 
Jang Bahadur on his trip to Europe). Evidence internal to 
the document suggests that the assistant working with 
Hodgson in Darjeeling on Saturday, the 1st of Jesth-month, 
1904 Bikram Sam bat (BS = 184 7 of the Christian Era), 
was probably a high caste man from the Newar commu-
nity-the ethnic group dominant in the Kathmandu Valley 
and associated with its many high cultural traditions. In 
particular, throughout the document, there m·e misspellings 
of the sort typically made by native-Newari speaking per-
sons bilingual into Nepal, such as: 
<miT'lfu ~ (('!41 !'{ <11 { 'l1l<1 ~ "lffi[ ~ iif'IT'l <Ffl lffifl1T 
6lf<;r ~ ll'if3 ~~~I~~~ I 
~~.'llT('lll;;J'R~I 
After this, the new mother is fed rice and chicken, 
with spices and ground jwanu. Fenugreek seed is 
fed after it is fried in oil. Jwanu makes mother's 
milk come in. Fenugreek binds the body; rice beer 
is served to the mother. 
In this short passage alone several words are spelled 
according to common Newari mispronunciations includ-
ing s16, d]l7, and hfb. These misspellings bespeak the 
scribe's own ethnicity, but throughout the document there 
are, as well, other revealing linguistic and stylistic move-
ments. The inclusion ofTamang terms for certain items or 
rituals sometimes appears to index practices so outside high 
caste expectations that the scribe is obliged to note them 
and occasionally comment on them. 
About Dhan Krishna Yonjen, the Tamang person who 
was interviewed some 150 years ago, so far, we know only 
what the document records. He (we are reasonably confi-
dent he was a man) came from a village called Phulbari or 
'Flowergarden' for which there are several possible con-
temporary candidates, in the Timal region, still a very im-
portant Tamang area of residence, lying precisely within 
the four boundary points named in the original document, 
as the opening passages of the document describe: 
~>.ft ~ 9~0¥ m<'f filfu ~ ~ 9 n;;r \9 'i.PT ~ ~ 
~~~~~lllir~~~ 
~ful~ <1'>"lH\?:41<1 'l#f~ I 
Auspiciously dated the year 1904 (VS) Jesth 1st the 
7th day (Saturday): Their customary rites written 
according to the oral testimony of Dhan Krishna 
Yonjen from Phulbari Village, Temal, called by them 
Lajyang Timal. 
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~ ~ ffi'\ -mm '1<f ~ qfu;1:{ ~ Gfuur 
4W<l4•11~fi.il ~ m Fll""f ;;rm "lT(f ~ <l4'<T ~J 
Their place of origin lies west of Sanga, east of 
Tamva Kosi, south ofDolakha, north of Mortidunga; 
within these (boundaries), they are called the eigh-
teen clans of the twelve Tamang. 
This Dhan Krishna Yonjen seems quite knowledgeable 
about many aspects of Tamang ritual practice, much of 
which is recognizably consonant with contemporary prac-
tice, but his knowledge does not exceed that of an ordinary 
adult layperson. He does not, for example, offer any ritual 
recitations associated with any of the practices, as either a 
lama (a specialist in Buddhist text) or a bombo (a shaman) 
almost certainly would have. 
The project triangulating the production ofTamang iden-
tity in Nepal 
Building upon the translation work and analysis already 
done, as well as several interviews of various contempo-
rary Tamang, we want to show how the vision of Tamang 
identity produced in this text results from a complex colo-
nial, national, and ethnic history. The specific work of this 
international collaborative project is part of a larger ongo-
ing project that David Holmberg and Kathryn March have 
been conducting since 1993 on the genesis ofTamang iden-
tity in Nepal. In this portion of that work, we plan to work 
with Mukta Singh Tamang and Amrit Yonjan during the 
1999-2000 winter intersession to complete analysis of the 
document itself and its related contemporary interviews to 
show the interplay of British colonial and scholarly inter-
ests with those of the elite national interests of the scribe-
assistant and those of the local Tamang informant. 
We will be focusing specifically upon those moments 
in the document when each viewpoint dominates. For ex-
ample, we believe we can show how in some instances the 
caste-based understanding of identity as embedded in the 
life cycle of Sanskritic rites of passage dominates. In the 
description of birth ritual, for instance, the document 
records: 
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~ ~ mn- '"f'!!T flf'f "' ~ '"f'!!T c; m ~ l]";f <m 1 (.ffl1T 
~~ 
They have to the naming ceremony on the 9th day 
(after the birth) if (the baby is) a son and on the 8th 
day if it is a daughter. They invite a lama (for the 
ceremony). 
And 
.~ ~ 1<iJo11 ~f}[Uff ~ I ~ 3IT'ff "'R Wfu.R 
3IT'ff ~~I 
After this, they have to give a payment/gift (yon) to 
the lama. For a son, 4 anna, for a daughter 2 anna 
must be given. 
No contemporary Tamang interviewed could imagine 
any context, past or present, in which Tamang people would 
do different birth rituals for girls as opposed to boys. Nor 
is the idea that the birth of girl children should be less ritu-
ally heralded a particularly British one. Here, the inevi-
table inference is that idea that girls' rituals should be hastier 
and less elaborate probably originated with the scribe-as-
sistant, according to whose high caste expectations these 
differentials would be commonplace. 
There are important observations to be made about the 
interplay of high caste and British social ideology through 
this document. Too often, studies of the colonial encoun-
ter focus upon the European domination of the local with-
out adequately analyzing the role of local elites. This work 
with the Hodgson papers will help show how local elites 
(true 'subalterns') in South Asia have had pivotal roles in 
formulating scholarly understanding of the region . In 
Munniharu ko kulachar, in particular, it is important to 
understand how the performance of religious life cycle ritu-
als became the primary markers of ethnic identity to the 
exclusion of other social, political and economic forces. 
Although Tamang need to be understood as peasant farm-
ers, who were excluded from virtually all emergent state 
opportunities at the same time that they were expected to 
provide most of the manual labor upon which that state 
was built, this Hodgson document formulates them prima-
rily in terms of life cycle rites. This view, which certainly 
became Hodgson's, is remarkably consonant with that of 
high-caste Hindu parbatiya-s in Nepal, whose privilege it 
protects even more than it secures European dominion. 
In other passages, however, the Tamang point of view 
does not yield to the expectations of caste. In the descrip-
tion of marriage rituals, for instance, the scribe-assistant 
records both the permissibility of patrilateral cross-cousin 
marriage and of respectful flows of behavior and gifts go-
ing from the groom's family to the bride's. Both of these 
would be unthinkable in a high caste world. 
~ 1 ~wn <1T'ff ~ ~ ~c.r~~ 
'h'hii<11ii>l ~ ~I 
Bilw laba. Bachan chlwna laba. According to their 
marri age customs, marriage with the mother's 
brother's son and the father's sister's son is permit-
ted. 
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~ 0111"11<'11'1<11~ ~ ~ I ~ ~ ..-frnr '3"~ ffi<l; 
~ ~ '.,-r~IT ~ <F<Il<1 ~ ~ ~ <F<Il<1 
mrm m& "~ <:fiR "f'ffff.t 'lf.1 ~ ..-rrnr w-t ~ ~ 
When they get to her house and give the gifts, both 
the daughter and the son-in-law bow down to her 
mother and father. The daughter lifts her mother's 
feet and bows to them . She bows to her father with 
her head at his knees; he lifts her head with his hands. 
Then the son-in-law also touches his mother-in-
law's feet as he bows down to her. 
Most striking of all, however, are the passages on sati 
recorded in this document, which I reproduce in their en-
tirety below. Sati, of course, is the self-immolation of wid-
ows on their husbands' funeral pyres. Along with foot-
binding and female genital mutilation, sati (as many other 
writers have explored) stood as an important icon for the 
British of the barbarism of the non-western world. Efforts 
to eradicate sati regularly reminded British colonial offic-
ers in South Asia of their self-proclaimed civilizing nus-
sian. This passage leaps into the record so completely 
outside of the otherwise dominant organization of life cycle 
rituals that we can fairly hear Hodgson 's explicit question . 
~ ~ "11"'11<:«1< 3!fu Pm . . ~ 'A"""'IT 91~ 
~~~~~~il'!Hrmn::r~~ 
~ <rl1 <:[jfu-~ 1:flf.1 ~ I 
In the past they didn't have the custom of going in 
sati . ............... Nowadays one or two go. They don't 
forbid it. The one who followed her husband in 
death according to the custom of sati, just like a 
parbatya, saying "Ram," pours water on her head. 
"1!fu Tf'<1T'lfu ~ 1T'f m 1 <1TI"IT GTfu> ~ -zru TT""llf -mT"1T11 
-.m- -rm. ~.on-, <fl<1, fu'3", 3f!ihrr -.m-~ ~ 1 
After [she] does all this, it is not possible to forbid 
her [doing or becoming sati]. They invite and bring 
a lama to do yanya and right afterwards taking along 
a cow, milk, barley, sesame seed, clarified butter, 
and acheta, they have to take her to the cremation 
grounds. 
mm ~ ;;IT 3!T'fi3T ~ ;rm~ ~ ~ fG" <m 
m ~ fu-rtrr fu '"fflT "ffi1T f<1111f<i'11'l'' m ~ '111:( -.nnn 
qf., ~ M; <IT~ ;;it ~ ~ -.m- <m'!R ~ -.m-
~fi1<H?.f€l ~I 
In the house, the sati must take care of the affairs 
of her own husband, making good on whatever 
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goods, debt, interest, or trade he took or gave, as 
well as whatever this way or that, with or without, 
paying out whatever ?tenth, sixth or quarter share 
of profit that's due, balancing all trade, the sati 
comes forth from the house. 
~ ~ mm- <1TI"Il""it 3!fu <ne: <1lf1T 3!fu ~ 1 ~ 
~ <ilfuo:rr lnffi "'11fu; ~ I ~ W 'i!T;j <JT;j ~ 
~hfiul 
The corpse is taken out in front by the lama first as 
always according to custom. After this, putting and 
cmTying the sati in a palanquin, she is carried off. 
Distributing uncooked rice and money here and 
there to the gods, they go. 
~ <1fTT ~ mm-~ ~ <1fTT ~ ~ -mw 
~lf1:IR1'Tft~~~wm<<1TI"Il""it~rm1oi'r 
<fl<1 ~I 
Making conversation all the way, according to the 
customs of forever, taking them onto a high hill, 
digging a pit, building a pyre platform and getting 
ready, they carry and place the corpse on the pyre 
platform and the lama does janya. He throws bar-
ley and sesame seed. 
<miT me ~ G"G ~ ~ ·.,f, Tflt;N G"G <rc0<wlT < 
~ ~ ~ ~ < "1!fu 'If<~ '141 qfg; ~ "ffi<ln:rr 3!T"'l\'ff 
~<ii'r~~q-ffi-~lnfu-~1 
After that, saying that they will show Dudh Kundh 
to the sati, they make the sati look into a bronze 
bowl of cow's milk and, after finishing doing that, 
the sati, on the pyre platform with her own hus-
band, keeping him on her right side, embracing him, 
lies down. 
~ ('1ru" "ffi<n:n ~ ~ ·.,f, ~ ~ tml <nfld 
;:n:nf<r ~ P<Tft1 ~ '"ffT 1'Tft wm; < W<r ~ Wm:r GJ1T 
3flllT ~ , W<r ~ GT-J1l ·~ 3fTTfr fm , 3fTTfr ~ 
fml 
After that, saying the sati might get out of the pyre 
platform, so that she won't be able to get out, tying 
her to a pole, pressing firewood on top of her, mak-
ing a big barrier, they put her there and the son (if 
they have a son) lights the fire; if they don't have a 
son, the older and younger brothers light the fire; 
they start the fire. 
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''ll1f<wm'1 m<nfu ~ 'fl'i!T ~ Tift mmn Tift ~ 
~ ~ Tift ~ l"JU I ~ mtiT ~ ~ "< <'llif 
<m> ~ P<lfir <'llif Tift trfu ~ ' ~ >fi-~ <'llif 
Wfu ~ ~ >fi- ~~"'Tift m ~ 1 ~ ·A'! 
11<11fll~~<11~ ~~~·A'!~~ m m ~ 
1. . . 
Whistling loudly from all four sides of the pyre plat-
form, making loud noises with all kinds of instru-
ments, shouting "HaHaHa," not letting the sati's 
words get out, they make loud noises. They let the 
pyre platform be completely destroyed and press-
ing down with the wood and firewood of it, doing 
this, they bum the sati and, as always, bathe right 
after leaving the cremation grounds and, as always, 
doing the rituals all along the path, they get home. 
As always, they give the malami-s food and drink, 
and, as always, everyone goes home to their own 
houses. 
~ ~ crrft' fu'1 ~ il:o1 ~ ~ ' ~ ~ 
~ ~ nn<f<1l<fr ~ ~ ~ f<c!f.t l"lU ' 
'l!ftf~~~~'<i'i<.J;~q{f'f{liTI 
Avoiding pollution for three days, for three whole 
days, as always, according to the customary prac-
tices since forever and building an inheritance for 
both husband and wife, they do what is called do-
ing the purifications of gyawalmva according to 
ancient custom and they need two sacred sculptures. 
All the other things are the same. 
~ fu'f qfu <!T<1'l' "l'f <'t<:f 'l1'f ;;m3!ftr<it f<rtU <lift: ~ 
~~m~1'l't~lit1~~~1'f't~ 
1. . 
To put?, to light lamps, to open the way for salt and 
oil, whatever previously described rituals, as de-
scribed above, everything is the same as for all death 
observances . They don't have to do anything spe-
cial [for a sati]. 
Discussions about whether or not Tamang ever prac-
ticed sati were heated in our various interviews. Most 
Tamang people were quick to assert that they did not. One 
incident of a Tamang sati was reported . Amrit Yonjan is 
following up on that report with some additional interviews. 
We think that it is likely to be a case involving aTamang-
origin woman who had bee n taken into (often bor~ded) do-
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mestic service in an elite and hi gh caste household in 
Kathmandu and who might have been expected to sati along 
with other women in the household . The passage itself is 
interesting in, first, its oblique statement that 'sa ti is not 
forbidden' and, next, in its assertion that, when done, it is 
done "just like a parbatya," which is the term of reference 
for caste Hindus; the remainder of the passage recites San-
skritic passage with only the most passing references to 
Tamang mortuary practice. 
All these examples point to a much more nuanced un-
derstanding of both European and internal colonization in 
the Nepali context. Rather than documenting the absolute 
domination of British ideas and interests, there is a richer 
weave. Hodgson 's fascination with life cycle ritual coalsces 
well with caste Hindu idealizations about the centrality of 
life cycle rituals as the defining marks of identity, but not 
about the legitimacy of sati. Tamang reliance upon lama-
s to pe1form many of their rituals can, in some ways, be 
transposed with the caste Hindu prevalence of Brahmin 
priests. Over the life course idealized in these rituals, how-
ever, the centrality of maiTiage to caste Hindu construc-
tions of life contrasts sharply with the Tamang emphasis 
upon death rituals as the most important. In these, and 
many other, examples, this document is an important record 
of how identities were formed in the colonial and 
postcolonial period. 
In the contemporary context, the various debates gen-
erated by this document, and the meetings and interviews 
we have done about it, need to be understood as part of 
recent developments in ethnic identity politics in Nepal. 
Since the political changes of 1990, which limited the pow-
ers of the monarchy under a new national constitution which 
promised substantial freedoms, including rights to a free 
press, use of languages other than Nepali, and electoral 
politics, members of many previously suppressed ethnic 
groups have been trying to understand the history of their 
exclusion from national politics and opp011unities . Through 
the formation of various ethnic pride associations, they have 
been trying to (re)write their histories. The record of their 
engagement with this document provides important insights 
into these more modern processes of identity formation as 
well. 
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